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Tidyman’s Management Services, Inc. v. Davis: The Duty to Defend Is
Irrevocable in Montana
Carrie Gibadlo
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tidyman’s Management Services, Inc. v. Davis,1 (Tidyman’s)
the Montana Supreme Court neglected to address the underlying issue:
whether an insurer’s duty to defend is revocable. Although the Court did
not directly address revocability, the holding requires an insurer to
provide defense after it acknowledges a duty to defend even if the insurer
knows of information that undisputedly negates coverage. Therefore, the
Court indirectly held the duty to defend is irrevocable. The holding is
consistent with legislative intent.
II. TIDYMAN’S MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. V. DAVIS
A. Facts
The plaintiff employees filed a complaint in federal court against
the officers and directors of Tidyman’s, including Michael Davis (Davis)
and John Maxwell (Maxwell).2 The complaint alleged breach of
corporate and fiduciary duties for misrepresenting the merit of a merger
between Tidyman’s and SuperValu.3 The other Tidyman’s officers and
directors settled their claims.4 National Union Fire Insurance Company
(National Union) provided defense to Davis and Maxwell in federal court
until the case was dismissed without prejudice.5 The plaintiffs then filed
a complaint in state district court against Maxwell and Davis alleging the
same claims previously filed in federal court.6 When the plaintiffs filed
the state court claim, Tidyman’s was added as a plaintiff.7
After the state court litigation commenced, Chartis Claims, Inc.
(Chartis), which managed claims on behalf of National Union, sent
Maxwell’s and Davis’s counsel a letter stating National Union would not
cover their defense because the insurance policy’s “insured v. insured”

1

Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 330 P.3d 1139 (Mont. 2014). This Case Note will not address
the Montana Supreme Court’s order to the district court to consider the substantive reasonableness of
the stipulated settlement nor the Court’s third ruling on the resolution of conflict of law issues where
an insurance contract does not contain a choice-of-law provision.
2
Id. at 1143.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1143.
7
Id.
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exclusion allowed National Union to deny coverage where one party
insured under a policy sued another party insured under the same policy.8
Maxwell, Davis, and Tidyman’s were insured by National Union,
implicating the exclusion.9 Davis’s and Maxwell’s counsel wrote Chartis
on three occasions to inquire whether National Union would continue to
provide coverage.10 After the third letter, counsel for Chartis replied and
denied coverage.11 While waiting for a response, Davis’s counsel filed a
stipulation agreement alleging National Union wrongfully denied
defense.12 Before judgment on the stipulation, a National Union
representative wrote to Maxwell and Davis and advised them that
National Union would advance defense costs subject to a full reservation
of rights.13 After receiving the letter from National Union, Maxwell and
the plaintiffs filed an identical stipulation to the one Davis had moved to
approve and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment alleging
National Union breached its duty to defend.14 The district court held that
National Union breached its duty to defend and granted the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment and motions to approve stipulations for
entry of judgment.15
B. Majority Holding
In a four-to-one majority opinion authored by Justice Mike
Wheat, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding
that National Union breached its duty to defend.16 The Court held that
National Union’s duty to defend was triggered by the federal complaint
because the plaintiffs alleged facts which were clearly covered under the
policy.17 The Court noted that National Union acknowledged the policy
was implicated in federal court by defending the claim.18 Therefore, the
district court was correct to refuse to analyze coverage under the state
court complaint.19 The Court held that “all that matters is that National
Union was on notice that the Policy was potentially implicated.”20 The
Court reiterated that insurers should defend under a reservation of rights
and seek a determination of coverage through a declaratory judgment.21
8

Id. at 1143–1144.
Appellant’s. Br., Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 2013 WL 6048695 at *33 (Mont. Aug. 1,
2014) (No. DA 13-0228).
10
Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1144.
11
Id.
12
Id
13
Id.
14
Id. at 1144–1145.
15
Id. at 1146.
16
Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1150–1151.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 1150.
21
Id. at 1151.
9
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C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Laurie McKinnon argued that the Majority contradicted
precedent by refusing to consider whether the facts alleged in the state
complaint implicated policy coverage.22 She contended that an insurer
has a right to deny defense due to policy exclusions and the Court must
consider the policy before imposing a duty to defend.23 In her opinion,
by holding the duty to defend hinges on notice rather than the content of
the notice, the Majority’s analysis expands the duty to defend.24
III. ANALYSIS
Tidyman’s is a case of first impression in the Court with two
factors distinguishable from precedent: (1) the insurer was notified
about the allegations of a claim in two complaints, in contrast to one,
which provided the insurer with additional information; and (2) the
insurer acknowledged a duty to defend in the federal action but
attempted to revoke defense prior to litigation in state court. The
opinion is significant for what the Court indirectly decided: in Montana,
the duty to defend is irrevocable. The holding expands Montana’s duty
to defend and confirms the Legislature’s intent to define the duty to
defend broadly to protect the insured.
A. Tidyman’s Qualifies Precedent in Montana
Under Montana law, the duty to defend arises when the insurer
receives notice of a risk covered under a policy by looking at allegations
of a claim in the complaint.25 In Farmers Union Mutual Insurance v.
Staples,26 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant co-owned horses and as
a result was covered under a third-party’s insurance policy.27 The
insurer denied defense after deciding the defendant was not a coowner.28 The Court found that the insurer erred in denying defense
because ownership was a disputed fact and therefore must be resolved
in favor of coverage.29 If policy coverage is invoked in the complaint,
the Court does not analyze disputed facts, but rather it confines the duty
to defend analysis to the complaint.30 An insurer has a duty to defend
22

Id. at 1158–1159 (McKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
24
Id. at 1160.
25
Grindheim v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 F.Supp 794, 798 (D. Mont. 1995).
26
90 P.3d 381 (Mont. 2004).
27
Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 383 (Mont. 2004).
28
Id. at 384.
29
Id. at 385.
30
Id. at 386.
23
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when facts alleged in the complaint clearly come within coverage of the
insurance policy.31
In Tidyman’s, the facts in the federal complaint clearly invoked
policy coverage, but the insurer had knowledge of undisputed facts that
negated coverage. Unlike the insurer in Staples that denied defense
based on factual disputes, National Union denied defense because
Tidyman’s was added as a plaintiff and invoked the “insured v. insured”
exclusion. The Court did not find that the facts were disputed.32
Instead, the Court referred to the facts as irrelevant, because the
complaint implicated coverage.33 Without evaluating the facts, the Court
relied upon Staples to confine its analysis to the facts alleged in the
federal complaint.34 However, the Court failed to acknowledge that
factual disputes are significantly different than undisputed facts when
determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend.
Under Montana law, when the insurer learns of additional,
undisputed facts, the insurer can use the information to negate or invoke
coverage.35 If the insurer considers facts outside of the complaint, and
incorrectly denies coverage, the insurer is estopped from denying
coverage and becomes liable for costs and judgments.36 Thus, an insurer
considers facts outside of a complaint at its own risk.37
In Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co.,38 the insured was
charged with aggravated assault.39 The complaint alleged negligence,
which implicated the policy; however, the insured recorded a statement
causing the insurer to believe the altercation was intentional and not
self-defense.40 Because the acts were not actually negligent, the insured
was not covered under the policy.41 As a result, the insurer refused
defense.42 The Court upheld the insurer’s refusal to defend, despite the
complaint’s implication of the policy, because the undisputed facts in
the case clearly showed that the policy excluded coverage.43

31

Id.
Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1150.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
E.g. Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., 765 P.2d 712 (Mont. 1988); Revelation Indus v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 P.3d 919 (Mont. 2009).
36
Tidyman’s Mgt. Servs., 330 P.3d at 1149.
37
Id.
38
765 P.2d 712 (Mont. 1988).
39
Id. at 712.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 713.
42
Id.
43
Id.
32
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Conversely, in Revelation Industry v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company,44 the plaintiff alleged that damages were caused by
the insured manufacturing defective merchandise; however, a
subcontractor actually produced the products.45 The insurance policy
covered subcontractors who produced defective products, but not the
insured.46 The insurer knew the subcontractor actually manufactured the
products, yet denied defense.47 The Court held the insurer had a duty to
defend because, based on the undisputed facts, the policy was clearly
implicated.48 An insurer cannot ignore known facts which compel
coverage even if the factual allegations in the complaint do not fall
under the policy.49
In Tidyman’s, the majority failed to consider that undisputed
facts outside of the complaint can be considered to determine
coverage,50 and therefore undisputed facts are relevant. Under Montana
Law, the Court only confines its analysis to the complaint when
additional facts are disputed.51 In Tidyman’s, like in Burns, the insurer
learned of undisputed facts which negated policy coverage. Like in
Revelations, the new information learned by the insurer invoked a
policy exclusion. However, because National Union learned of the
information after acknowledging a duty to defend, the Court should
have recognized that Tidyman’s presented a case of first impression.
Tidyman’s asked the Court if an insurer could rely on additional
information to deny coverage after already acknowledging a duty to
defend. The Court failed to directly address this issue. However, by
holding that National Union had a duty to defend, the Majority requires
insurers to provide defense even when known facts clearly negate
coverage if the insurer has previously acknowledged coverage. The
holding implies that once a duty to defend is acknowledged, additional
information becomes irrelevant—the duty to defend is irrevocable.
B. Tidyman’s is Consistent with Legislative Intent
An irrevocable duty to defend in Montana is consistent with the
legislative intent, which distinguishes an insurer’s duty to defend from
its obligation to indemnify the insured.52 Under Montana law,
44

206 P.3d 919 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 921.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 925–926.
50
E.g. Burns, 765 P.2d 712; Revelations Indus., 206 P.3d 919.
51
E.g. Burns, 765 P.2d 712; Revelations Indus., 206 P.3d 919; Staples, 90 P.3d 381.
52
Mont. Code Ann. § 28–11–316.
45
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“[t]he person indemnifying is bound, on request of the
person indemnified, to defend actions or proceedings
brought against the person indemnified in respect to the
matters embraced by the indemnity[.] If, after request,
the person indemnifying neglects to defend the person
indemnified, a recovery against the person indemnified
suffered by the person indemnified in good faith is
conclusive in favor of the person indemnified against the
person indemnifying.”53
The Court has consistently interpreted the duty to defend as being
“distinct from, different from, independent of, and broader than the
insurer’s promise to pay on behalf the insured all sums which the
insured shall become obligated to pay[.]”54 The duty to defend seeks to
preserve “the fundamental protective purpose of an insurance policy and
the obligation of the insurer to provide a defense.”55 Had National
Union provided defense in state court, the insurer could have sought a
declaratory action to relieve them from liability from the cost of
judgment. They were not estopped from denying liability until revoking
defense, consistent with the policy interpretation that the duty to defend
is broader than an insurer’s obligation to pay. Likewise, by holding the
duty to defend irrevocable, the Court reiterated the message that
insurers should be prudent before denying coverage and instead seek a
declaratory action.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Tidyman’s, an insurer in Montana can deny coverage only
if the insurer has not previously acknowledged a duty to defend. The
Tidyman’s holding qualifies prior caselaw by holding that an insurer
loses its ability to use outside knowledge if it has already agreed to
provide defense. Although the Majority failed to distinguish Tidyman’s
from precedent and as a result, artificially confined their analysis, the
holding is consistent with the legislative intent to interpret the duty to
defend broadly and protect the insured.

53

Id.
McAlear v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 493 P.2d 331, 335 (Mont. 1972).
55
Id.
54

